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Abstract
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the most successful algorithm for
finding approximate Nash equilibria in imperfect information games. However,
CFR’s reliance on full game-tree traversals limits its scalability and generality.
Therefore, the game’s state- and action-space is often abstracted (i.e. simplified)
for CFR, and the resulting strategy is then translated back to the full game. This
requires extensive expert-knowledge, is not possible in many games outside of
poker, and often converges to highly exploitable policies. A recently proposed
method, Deep CFR, applies deep learning directly to CFR, allowing the agent to
intrinsically abstract and generalize over the state-space from samples, without
requiring expert knowledge. In this paper, we introduce Single Deep CFR (SD-
CFR), a variant of Deep CFR that has a lower overall approximation error by
avoiding the training of an average strategy network. We show that SD-CFR is
more attractive from a theoretical perspective and empirically outperforms Deep
CFR with respect to exploitability and one-on-one play in poker.
1 Introduction
In perfect information games, players usually seek to play an optimal deterministic strategy. In
contrast, sound policy optimization algorithms for imperfect information games converge towards a
Nash equilibrium, a distributional strategy characterized by minimizing the losses against a worst-
case opponent. The most popular family of algorithms for finding such equilibria is Counter-
factual Regret Minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2008). Conventional CFR methods itera-
tively traverse the game-tree to improve the strategy played in each state. For instance, CFR+
(Tammelin, 2014), a fast variant of CFR, was used to solve two-player Limit Texas Hold’em Poker
(Bowling et al., 2015; Tammelin et al., 2015), a variant of poker frequently played by humans.
However, the scalability of such tabular CFR methods is limited since they need to visit a given
state to update the policy played in it. In games too large to fully traverse, practitioners hence often
employ domain-specific abstraction schemes (Ganzfried & Sandholm, 2014; Brown et al., 2015)
that can be mapped back to the full game after training has finished. Unfortunately, these techniques
have been shown to lead to highly exploitable policies in the large benchmark game Heads-Up
No-Limit Texas Hold’em Poker (HUNL) (Lisy & Bowling, 2016) and typically require extensive
expert knowledge to design well. In an attempt to address these two problems, researchers started to
augment CFR with neural network function approximation, resulting in DeepStack (Moravcˇı´k et al.,
2017). Concurrently with Libratus (Brown & Sandholm, 2018a), DeepStack was one of the first
algorithms to defeat professional poker players in HUNL, a game consisting of 10160 states and thus
being far too large to fully traverse.
While tabular CFR has to visit a state of the game to update its policy in it, a parameterized pol-
icy may be able to play an educated strategy in states it has never seen before. Purely parameter-
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ized (i.e. non-tabular) policies have led to great breakthroughs in AI for perfect information games
(Mnih et al., 2015; Schulman et al., 2017; Silver et al., 2017) and were recently also applied to large
imperfect information games by Deep CFR (Brown et al., 2018a) to mimic a variant of tabular CFR
from samples.
Deep CFR’s strategy relies on a series of two independent neural approximations. In this paper,
we introduce Single Deep CFR (SD-CFR), a simplified variant of Deep CFR that obtains its final
strategy after just one neural approximation by using what Deep CFR calls value networks directly
instead of training an additional network to approximate the weighted average strategy. This re-
duces the overall sampling- and approximation error and makes training more efficient. We show
experimentally that SD-CFR improves upon the convergence of Deep CFR in poker games and
outperforms Deep CFR in one-one-one matches.
2 Extensive-form games
This section introduces extensive-form games and the notation we will use throughout this work.
Formally, a finite two-player extensive-form game with imperfect information is a set of histories
H, where each history is a path from the root φ ∈ H to any particular state. The subset Z ⊂ H
contains all terminal histories. A(h) is the set of actions available to the acting player at history
h, who is chosen from the set {1, 2, chance} by the player function P (h). In any h ∈ H where
P (h) = chance, the action is chosen by the dynamics of the game itself. LetN = {1, 2} be the set
of both players. When referring to a player i ∈ N , we refer to his opponent by −i. All nodes z ∈ Z
have an associated utility u(z) for each player. This work focuses on zero-sum games, defined by
the property ui(z) = −u−i(z) for all z ∈ Z .
Imperfect information is represented by partitioning H into information sets. An information set
Ii is a subset of H, where histories h, h
′ ∈ H are in the same information set if and only if player i
cannot distinguish between h and h′ given his private and all available public information. For each
player i ∈ N , an information partition Ii is a set of all such information sets. Let A(I) = A(h)
and P (I) = P (h) for all h ∈ I and each I ∈ Ii.
Each player i chooses actions according to a behavioural strategy σi, with σi(I, a) being the prob-
ability of choosing action a when in I . We refer to a tuple (σ1, σ2) as a strategy profile σ. Let
piσ(h) be the probability of reaching history h if both players follow σ and let piσi (h) be the prob-
ability of reaching h if player i acts according to σi and player −i always acts deterministically to
get to h. It follows that the probability of reaching an information set I if both players follow σ is
piσ(I) =
∑
h∈I pi
σ(h) and is piσi (I) =
∑
h∈I pi
σ
i (h) if −i plays to get to I .
Player i’s expected utility from any history h assuming both players follow strategy profile σ from
h onward is denoted by uσi (h). Thus, their expected utility over the whole game given a strategy
profile σ can be written as uσi (φ) =
∑
z∈Z pi
σ(z)ui(z).
Finally, a strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium if no player i could increase their
expected utility by deviating from σi while −i plays according to σ−i. We measure the exploitabil-
ity e(σ) of a strategy profile by how much its optimal counter strategy profile (also called best
response) can beat it by. Let us denote a function that returns the best response to σi by BR(σi).
Formally,
e(σ) = −
∑
i∈N
(ui(σi, BR(σi))
3 Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2008) is an iterative algorithm. It
can run either simultaneous or alternating updates. If the former is chosen, CFR produces a new
iteration-strategy σti for all players i ∈ N on each iteration t. In contrast, alternating updates
produce a new strategy for only one player per iteration, with player t mod 2 updating his on iteration
t.
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To understand how CFR converges to a Nash equilibrium, let us first define the instantaneous regret
for player i of action a ∈ A(I) in any I ∈ Ii as
rti(I, a) = pi
σt
−i(I)(v
σt
i (I, a)− v
σt
i (I)) (1)
where vσ
t
i (I) =
∑
h∈I
piσ
t
−i(h)u
σt
i (h)
piσ
t
−i(I)
and vσ
t
i (I, a) =
∑
h∈I
piσ
t
−i(h)u
σt
i (h
act
−−→a)
piσ
t
−i(I)
. Intuitively, rti(I, a)
quantifies how much more player i would have won (in expectation), had he always chosen a in I
and played to get to I but according to σt thereafter. The overall regret on iteration T isRTi (I, a) =∑T
t=1 r
t
i(I, a). Now, the iteration-strategy for player i can be derived by
σt+1i (I, a) =
{
Rti(I,a)+∑
a˜∈A(I) R
t
i(I,a˜)+
if
∑
a˜∈A(I)R
t
i(I, a˜)+ > 0
1
|A(I)| otherwise
(2)
where x+ = max(x, 0). Note that σ
0
i (I, a) =
1
|A(I)| .
The iteration-strategy profile σt does not converge to an equilibrium as t → ∞ in most variants of
CFR 1. The policy that has been shown to converge to an equilibrium profile is the average strategy
σ¯Ti . For all I ∈ Ii and each a ∈ A(I) it is defined as
σ¯Ti (I, a) =
∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I, a)∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)
(3)
3.1 Variations of CFR
Aiming to solve ever bigger games, researchers have proposed many improvements upon
vanilla CFR over the years (Tammelin et al., 2015; Brown & Sandholm, 2018a; Moravcˇı´k et al.,
2017). These improvements include alternative methods for regret updates (Tammelin, 2014;
Brown & Sandholm, 2018b), automated schemes for abstraction design (Ganzfried & Sandholm,
2014), and sampling variants of CFR (Lanctot et al., 2009). Many of the most successful algorithms
of the recent past also employ real-time solving or re-solving (Brown et al., 2018b; Moravcˇı´k et al.,
2017).
Discounted CFR (DCFR) (Brown & Sandholm, 2018b) slightly modifies the equations forRTi (I, a)
and σ¯Ti . A special case of DCFR is linear CFR (LCFR), where the contribution of the instantaneous
regret of iteration t as well as the contribution of σt to σ¯T is weighted by t. This change alone
suffices to let LCFR converge up to two orders of magnitude faster than vanilla CFR does in some
large games.
Monte-Carlo CFR (MC-CFR) (Lanctot et al., 2009) proposes a family of tabular methods that visit
only a subset of information sets on each iteration. Different variants of MC-CFR can be constructed
by choosing different sampling policies. One such variant is External Sampling (ES), which executes
all actions for player i, the traverser, in every I ∈ Ii but draws only one sample for actions not con-
trolled by i (i.e. those of −i and chance). In games with many player-actions Average Strategy
Sampling (Burch et al., 2012), Robust Sampling (Hui et al., 2018) are very useful. They, in differ-
ent ways, sample only a sub-set of actions for i. Both LCFR and a similarly fast variant called CFR+
(Tammelin, 2014) are compatible with forms of MC sampling, although CFR+ was regarded as to
sensitive to variance until recently (Schmid et al., 2018).
4 Deep CFR
CFR methods either need to run on the full game tree or employ domain-specific abstractions. The
former is infeasible in large games and the latter not easily possible in all domains. Deep CFR
(Brown et al., 2018a) computes an approximation of linear CFR (Brown & Sandholm, 2018b) with
alternating player updates. It is sample-based and does not need to store regret tables, making it
generally applicable to any two-player zero-sum game.
1In CFR-BR (Johanson et al., 2012) σt does converge probabilistically as t → inf and in CFR+
(Tammelin, 2014) it often does so empirically (but without guarantees); in vanilla CFR and linear CFR
(Brown & Sandholm, 2018b) σt typically does not converge.
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On each iteration, Deep CFR fits a value network Dˆi for one player i to approximatewhat we call ad-
vantage, which is defined as DTi (I, a) =
RTi,linear(I,a)
∑
T
t=1(tpi
σt
−i(I))
, where RTi,linear(I, a) =
∑T
t=1(tr
t
i(I, a)).
In large games, reach-probabilities naturally are (on average) very small after many tree-branchings.
Considering that it is hard for neural networks to learn values across many orders of magnitude
(van Hasselt et al., 2016), Deep CFR divides RT
i,linear(I,a) by the total linear reach
∑T
t=1(tpi
σt
−i(I))
and thereby avoids this problem. This still yields correct results because
∑T
t=1(tpi
σt
−i(I)) is identical
for all a ∈ A(I).
We can derive the iteration-strategy for t+ 1 fromDt similarly to CFR in equation 2 by
σt+1i (I, a) =
{
Dti (I,a)+∑
a˜∈A(I) D
t
i (I,a˜)+
if
∑
a˜∈A(I)D
t
i(I, a˜)+ > 0
1
|A(I)| otherwise
(4)
However, Deep CFR modifies this to heuristically choose the action with the highest advantage
whenever
∑
a˜∈A(I)D
t
i(I, a˜)+ ≤ 0. Deep CFR obtains the training data for Dˆ via batched external
sampling (Lanctot et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2018a). All instantaneous regret values collected over
the N traversals are stored in a memory buffer Bvi . After its maximum capacity is reached, B
v
i is
updated via reservoir sampling (Vitter, 1985). To mimic the behaviour of linear CFR, we need to
weight the training losses between the predictions Dˆ makes and the sampled regret vectors in Bvi
with the iteration-number on which a given datapoint was added to the buffer.
At the end of its training procedure (i.e. after the last iteration), Deep CFR fits another neural
network Sˆi(I, a) to approximate the linear average strategy
σ¯Ti (I, a) =
∑T
t=1(tpi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I, a))∑T
t=1(tpi
σt
i (I))
(5)
Data to train Sˆi is collected in a separate reservoir bufferB
s
i during the same traversals that data for
Bvi is being collected on. Recall that external sampling always samples all actions for the traverser,
let us call him i, and plays according to σt−i for the opponent. Thus, when i is the traverser, −i is
the one who adds his strategy vector σt−i(I) to B
s
−i in every I ∈ I−i visited during this traversal.
This elegantly assures that the likelihood of σt−i(I) being added to B
s
−i on any given traversal is
proportional to piσ
t
−i(I). Like before, we also need to weight the training loss for each datapoint by
the iteration-number on which the datapoint was created.
Notice that tabular CFR achieves importance weighting between iterations through multiplying with
some form of the reach probability (see equations 1 and 3). In contrast, Deep CFR does so by
controlling the expected frequency of datapoints from different iterations occurring in its buffers
and by weighting the neural network losses differently for data from each iteration.
5 Single Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization (SD-CFR)
Notice that storing all iteration-strategies would allow one to compute the average strategy on the
fly during play both in tabular and approximate CFR variants. In tabular methods, the gain of not
needing to keep σ¯ in memory during training would come at the cost of storing t equally large tables
(though potentially on disk) during training and during play. However, this is very different with
Deep CFR. Not aggregating into Sˆ removes the sampling- and approximation error that Bs and Sˆ
introduce, respectively. Moreover, the computational work needed to train Sˆ is no longer required.
Like in the tabular case, we do need to keep all iteration strategies, but this is much cheaper with
Deep CFR as strategies are compressed within small neural networks.
We will now look at two methods for querying σ¯ from a buffer of past value networksBM .
5.1 Acting on freely playable trajectories
Often (e.g. in one-one-one evaluations and during rollouts), a trajectory is played from the root of
the game-tree and the agent is only required to return action-samples of the average strategy on each
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step forward. In this case, SD-CFR chooses a value network Dˆti ∈ B
M
i at the start of the game,
where each Dˆti is assigned sampling weight t. The policy σi, which this network gives by equation
4, is now going to be used for the whole game trajectory. We call this method trajectory-sampling.
By applying the sampling weights when selecting a Dˆi ∈ B
M
i , we satisfy the linear averaging con-
straint of equation 5, and by using the same σi for the whole trajectory starting at the root, we ensure
that the iteration-strategies are also weighted proportionally to each of their reach-probabilities in
any given state along that trajectory. The latter happens naturally, since Dˆti of any t produces σ
t
i ,
which reaches each information set I with a likelihood directly proportional to piσ
t
i (I) when playing
from the root.
The query cost of this method is constant with the number of iterations (and equal to the cost of
querying Deep CFR).
5.2 Querying a complete action distribution in any information set
Let us now consider querying the complete action probability distribution σ¯Ti (I) in some informa-
tion set I ∈ Ii. Given B
M
i , we can compute σ¯
T
i (I) exactly through equation 5, where we compute
piσ
t
i (I) =
∏
I′∈I,P (I′)=i,a′:I′→I
σti(I
′, a′) (6)
Here, I ′ ∈ I means that I ′ is on the trajectory leading to I and a′ : I ′ → I is the action selected in
I ′ leading to I .
This computation can be done with at most2 as many feedforward passes through each network in
BMi as player i had decisions along the trajectory to I , typically taking a few seconds in poker when
done on a CPU.
5.3 Querying a complete action distribution on a trajectory
If a trajectory is played forward from the root, as is the case in e.g. exploitability evaluation,
we can cache the step-wise reach-probabilities on each step Ik along the trajectory and compute
piσ
t
i (I
k+1) = σti(I
k+1, a′)piσ
t
i (I
k), where a′ is the action that leads from Ik to Ik+1. This reduces
the number of queries per step to at most |BMi |.
5.4 Theoretical and practical properties
SD-CFR always mimics σ¯Ti correctly from the iteration-strategies it is given. Thus, if these iteration-
strategies were perfect approximations of the real iteration-strategies, SD-CFR is equivalent to linear
CFR (see Theorem 2), which is not necessarily true for Deep CFR (see Theorem 1).
As we later show in an experiment, SD-CFR’s performance degrades if reservoir sampling is per-
formed on BM after the number of iterations trained exceeds the buffer’s capacity. Thankfully, the
neural network proposed to be used for Deep CFR in large poker games has under 100,000 param-
eters (Brown et al., 2018a) and thus requires under 400KB of disk space. Deep CFR is usually
trained for just a few hundred iterations (Brown et al., 2018a), but storing even 25,000 such net-
works on disk would need only 10GB of disk space. At no point during any computation do we
need all networks in memory. Thus, keeping all value networks will not represent a problem in
practise.
Observing that Deep CFR and SD-CFR depend upon the accuracy of the value networks in exactly
the same way, we can conclude that SD-CFR is a better or equally good approximation of linear
CFR as long as all value networks are stored. Though this shows that SD-CFR is largely superior in
theory, it is not implicit that SD-CFR will always produce stronger strategies empirically. We will
investigate this next.
Theorem 1. If the capacity of strategy buffer Bsi is finite or if only a finite number K of traversals
is executed per iteration, Bsi is not guaranteed to reflect the true average strategy σ¯
T
i (I) for every
2This number can further be reduced by omitting queries for any σt as soon as it assigns probability 0 to the
action played on the trajectory.
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I ∈ Ii even if all value networks are perfect approximators of the true advantage after any number
of training iterations T > 2. Hence, even a perfect function approximator for Sˆ is not guaranteed
to model σ¯Ti without error.
Theorem 2. Assume that for all i ∈ N , all I ∈ Ii, all a ∈ A(I), and all t up to the number
of iterations trained T , Dˆti(I, a) = D
t
i(I, a) (i.e. that all value networks perfectly model the true
advantages). Now, SD-CFR represents σ¯Ti without error. This holds for both trajectory-sampling
SD-CFR and for when SD-CFR computes σ¯Ti (I) explicitly. Furthermore, an opponent has no way of
distinguishing which of the two proposed methods of sampling from σ¯ is used solely from gameplay.
Proofs for both Theorem 1 and 2 can be found in the appendix.
6 Experiments
We empirically evaluate SD-CFR by comparing to Deep CFR and by analyzing the effect of sam-
pling on BM . Recall that Deep CFR and SD-CFR are equivalent in how they train their value
networks. This allows both algorithms to share the same value networks in our experiments, which
makes comparisons far less susceptible to variance over algorithm runs and conveniently guarantees
that both algorithms tend to the same Nash equilibrium.
Where not otherwise noted, we use hyperparamters as Brown et al. (2018a) do. Our environment ob-
servations include additional features such as the size of the pot and represent cards as concatenated
one-hot vectors without any higher level features, but are otherwise as Brown et al. (2018a).
6.1 Leduc
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(a) Comparing SD-CFR and Deep CFR
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10 (4MiB)
50 (20MiB)
100 (40MiB)
500 (198MiB)
1000 (396MiB)
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(b) Sampling on BM with finite capacity
Figure 1: Empirical analysis of SD-CFR in Leduc Hold’em Poker. Results in Figure 1a and 1b are
averaged over five and three runs, respectively.
Figure 1a shows the exploitability (i.e. loss against a worst-case opponent) of SD-CFR and Deep
CFR in Leduc Poker (Southey et al., 2005) measured in milli-antes per game (mA/g).
In Leduc Poker, players start with an infinite number of chips. The deck has six cards of two suits
{a, b} and three ranks {J,Q,K}. There are two betting rounds: preflop and flop. After the preflop,
a card is publicly revealed. At the start of the game, each player adds 1 chip, called the ante, to the
pot and is dealt one private card. There are at most two bets/raises per round, where the bet-size is
fixed at 2 chips in the preflop, and 4 chips after the flop is revealed. If no player folded, the winner
is determined via hand strength. If a player made a pair with the public card, they win. Otherwise
K > Q > J . If both players hold a card of the same rank, the pot is split.
Hyperparameters are chosen to favour Deep CFR as the neural networks and buffers are very large
in relation to the size of the game. Yet, we find that SD-CFR minimizes exploitability better than
Deep CFR. Exact hyperparameters can be found in the supplementary material.
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DEPTH ROUND DIF MEAN DIF STD N
0 PF 0.012± 0.0001 0.017 200K
1 PF 0.013± 0.0001 0.018 100K
2 FL 0.052± 0.0003 0.048 80K
3 FL 0.083± 0.0005 0.075 83K
4 FL 0.113± 0.0011 0.109 37K
5 FL 0.175± 0.0057 0.206 5K
Table 1: Disagreement between SD-CFR’s and Deep CFR’s average strategies. ”DEPTH”: num-
ber of player actions up until the measurement, ”ROUND”: PF=Preflop, FL=Flop, ”DIF MEAN”:
mean and 95% confidence interval of the absolute differences between the strategies over the ”N”
occurrences. ”DIF STD”: approximate standard deviation of agreement across information sets.
Although we concluded that storing all value networks is feasible, we analyze the effect of reservoir
sampling on BM in Figure 1b and find it leads to plateauing and oscillation, at least up to |BM | =
1000.
6.2 One-on-One in 5-Flop Hold’em Poker (5-FHP) against Deep CFR
30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300
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Algorithm Iterations
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Mean
Figure 2: One-on-One performance of Single
Deep CFR vs. Deep CFR. Dashed lines are inde-
pendent algorithm runs. All evaluations have 95%
confidence intervals between±5.4 and±6.51 and
are the average result of 3M poker hands each.
Figure 2 shows the results of one-one-one
matches between SD-CFR and Deep CFR
in 5-Flop Hold’em Poker (5-FHP). 5-FHP is
a large poker game similar to regular FHP
(Brown et al., 2018a), which was used to eval-
uate Deep CFR (Brown et al., 2018a). The
only difference is that 5-FHP uses five instead
of three flop cards, forcing agents to abstract
and generalize more. For details on FHP, please
refer to (Brown et al., 2018a). The neural ar-
chitecture is as Brown et al. (2018a). Both al-
gorithms again share the same value networks
during each training run. Like Brown et al.
(2018a), Bv and Bs have a capacity of 40 mil-
lion per player. On each iteration, we run a
batch of 300,000 external sampling traversals
and train a value network from scratch using a
batch size of 10,240 for 4,000 updates. Average
strategy networks are trained with a batch size
of 20,480 for 20,000 updates. SD-CFR’s BM
stores all value networks, requiring 120MB of
disk space, while each Bs needs around 25GB
of memory during training.
The y-axis plots SD-CFR’s average winnings against Deep CFR inmilli-big blinds per game (mbb/g)
measured every 30 iterations. For reference, 10 mbb/g is considered a good margin between humans
in Heads-Up Limit Hold’em (HULH), a game with longer action sequences, but similar minimum
and maximum winnings per game as 5-FHP. Measuring the performance on iteration t compares
how well the SD-CFR averaging procedure would do against the one of Deep CFR if the algorithm
stopped training after t iterations
Bs reached its maximum capacity of 40 million for both players by iteration 120 in all runs. Before
this point, SD-CFR defeats Deep CFR by a sizable margin, but even after that, SD-CFR clearly
defeats Deep CFR.
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6.2.1 Comparing strategies
We analyze how far the average strategies of SD-CFR and Deep CFR are apart at different depths of
the tree of 5-FHP. In particular, we measure
1
2
∑
i∈1,2
(EIi∼σ¯Ti
∑
a∈A(I)
|σ¯T,SDi (I, a)− σ¯
T,Sˆ
i (I, a)|)
We ran 200,000 trajectory rollouts for each player, where player i plays according to SD-CFR’s
average strategy σ¯
T,SD
i and−i plays uniformly random. Hence, we only evaluate on trajectories on
which the agent should feel comfortable. The two agents again share the same value networks and
thus approximate the same equilibrium. We trained for 180 iterations, a little more than it takes for
Bs and Bv to be full for both players. Table 1 shows that Deep CFR’s approximation is good on
early levels of the tree but has a larger error in information sets reached only after multiple decision
points.
7 Related Work
Regression CFR (R-CFR) (Waugh et al., 2015) applies regression trees to estimate regret values
in CFR and CFR+. Unfortunately, despite promising expectations, recent work failed to apply
R-CFR in combination with sampling (Srinivasan et al., 2018). Advantage Regret Minimization
(ARM) (Jin et al., 2017) is similar to R-CFR but was only applied to single-player environments.
Nevertheless, ARM did show that regret-based methods can be of interest in imperfect information
games much bigger, less structured, and more chaotic than poker.
DeepStack (Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017) was the first algorithm to defeat professional poker players in
one-on-one gameplay of Heads-Up No-Limit Hold’em Poker (HUNL) requiring just a single GPU
and CPU for real-time play. It accomplished this through combining real-time solving with counter-
factual value approximation with deep networks. Unfortunately, DeepStack relies on tabular CFR
methods without card abstraction to generate data for its counterfactual value networks, which could
make applications to domains with many more private information states than HUNL has difficult.
Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) (Heinrich & Silver, 2016) was the first algorithm to soundly
apply deep reinforcement learning from single trajectory samples to large extensive-form games.
While not showing record-breaking results in terms of exploitability, NFSP was able to learn a com-
petitive strategy in Limit Texas Hold’em Poker over just 14 GPU/days. Recent literature elaborates
on the convergence properties of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (Lanctot et al., 2017)
and introduces novel actor-critic algorithms (Srinivasan et al., 2018) that have similar convergence
properties as NFSP and SD-CFR.
8 Future Work
So far, Deep CFR was only evaluated in games with three player actions. Since external sampling
would likely be intractable in games with tens or more actions, one could employ outcome sampling
(Lanctot et al., 2009), robust sampling (Hui et al., 2018), Targeted CFR (?), or average-strategy-
sampling (Burch et al., 2012) in such settings.
To avoid action translation after training in an action-abstracted game, continuous approximations
of large discrete action-spaces where actions are closely related (e.g. bet-size selection in No-Limit
Poker games, auctions, settlements, etc.) could be of interest. This might be achieved by having
the value networks predict parameters to a continuous function whose integral can be evaluated
efficiently. The iteration-strategy could be derived by normalizing the advantage clipped below
0. The probability of action a could be calculated as the integral of the strategy on the interval
corresponding to a in the discrete space.
Given a few modifications to its neural architecture and sampling procedure, SD-CFR could po-
tentially be applied to much less structured domains than poker such as those that deep reinforce-
ment learning methods like PPO (Schulman et al., 2017) are usually applied to. A first step on
this line of research could be to evaluate whether SD-CFR is preferred over approaches such as
(Srinivasan et al., 2018) in these settings.
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9 Conclusions
We introduced Single Deep CFR (SD-CFR), a new variant of CFR that uses function approximation
and partial tree traversals to generalize over the game’s state space. In contrast to previous work,
SD-CFR extracts the average strategy directly from a buffer of value networks from past iterations.
We show that SD-CFR is more attractive in theory and performs much better in practise than Deep
CFR.
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A Hyperparameters of experiments performed in Leduc Hold’em Poker
Bv and Bs have a capacity of 1 million for each player. On each iteration, data is collected over
1,500 external sampling traversals and a new value network is trained to convergence (750 updates of
batch size 2048), initialized randomly at t < 2 and with the weights of the value net from iteration
t − 2 afterwards. Average-strategy networks are trained to convergence (5000 updates of batch
size 2048) always from a random initialization. All networks used for this evaluation have 3 fully-
connected layers of 64 units each, which adds up to more parameters than Leduc Hold’em has states.
All other hyperparameters were chosen as Brown et al. (2018a).
B Rules of Leduc Hold’em Poker
Leduc Hold’em Poker is a two-player game, were players alternate seats after each round. At the
start of the game, both players add 1 chip, the ante, to the pot and are dealt a private card (unknown
to the opponent) from a deck consisting of 6 cards: {A, A, B, B, C, C}. There are two rounds:
pre-flop and flop. The game starts at the pre-flop and transitions to the flop after both players have
acted and wagered the same number of chips. At each decision point, players can choose an action
from a subset of {fold,call, raise}. When a player folds, the game ends and all chips in the pot are
awarded to the opponent. Calling means matching the opponent’s raise. The first player to act in a
round has the option of checking, which is essentially a call of zero chips. Their opponent can then
bet or also check. When a player raises, he adds more chips to the pot than his opponent wagered so
far. In Leduc Hold’em, the number of raises per round is capped at 2. Each raise adds 2 additional
chips in the pre-flop round and 4 in the flop round. On the transition from pre-flop to flop, one card
from the remaining deck is revealed publicly. If no player folded and the game ends with a player
calling, they show their hands and determine the winner by the rule that if a player’s private card
matches the flop card, they win. Otherwise the player with the higher card according to ABC wins.
C Deep CFR performs well on early iterations in some games
We conducted experiments searching to investigate the harm caused by the function approximation
of Sˆ. We found that in variants of Leduc Hold’em (Southey et al., 2005) with more that 3 ranks
and multiple bets, the performance between Deep CFR and SD-CFR was closer. Below we plot the
exploitability curves of the early iterations in a variant of Leduc that uses a deck of 12 ranks and
allows a maximum of 6 instead of 2 bets per round.
We believe the smaller difference in performance is due to the equilibrium in this game being less
sensitive to small differences in action probabilities, while the game is still small enough to see
every state often during training. In vanilla Leduc, slight deviations from optimal play give away
a lot about one’s private information as there are just three distinguishable cards. In contrast, this
variant of Leduc, despite having more states, might be less susceptible to approximation error as it
has 12 distinguishable cards but similarly simple rules.
For the plot below, we ran Deep CFR and SD-CFR with shared value networks, where all buffers
have a capacity of 4 million. On each iteration, data is collected over 8,800 external sampling
traversals and a new value network is trained to convergence (1200 updates of batch size 2816),
initialized randomly at t < 2 and with the weights of the value net from iteration t − 2 afterwards.
Average-strategy networks are trained to convergence (10000 updates of batch size 5632) from a
random initialization. The network architecture used is as Brown et al. (2018a), differing only by
the card-branch having 64 units per layer instead of 192.
D Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let I be any information set in Ii. Assuming that 0 < pi
σt
i (I) < 1. Recall that external
sampling samples only one action for player i and chance at any decision point, when −i is the
traverser. Since (1 − piσ
t
i (I))
K > 0 for any finite number of traversals K per iteration, we cannot
guarantee that I will be visited. If I is not visited despite piσ
t
i (I) > 0, the contribution of σ
t
i to
σ¯Ti (I) is not represented in B
s
i .
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Figure 3: Exploitability of Single Deep CFR and Deep CFR averaged over five runs.
For the second argument, we assume that K = ∞. Let I again be any information set in Ii in
which |A(I)| > 1. Assume that piσ
t
i (I) is irrational and that pi
σj
i (I) is rational. Clearly, because
its capacity is finite, Bsi could not reflect the ratio between pi
σt
i (I) and pi
σj
i (I) correctly through
the frequency of the appearance of samples from iterations t and j, regardless of the number of
traversals. Furthermore, in games where the number of members in the set
{I ∈ Ii : |A(I)| > 1, pi
σt
i (I) > 0}
is bigger than the capacity of Bsi , not every I ∈ I˜ can fit into B
s
i on iteration t, also making B
s
i an
incomplete representation of σ¯Ti (I).
E Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let BMi be a buffer of all value networks up to iteration T belonging to player i.
Since Dˆti(I, a) = D
t
i(I, a) for all I ∈ Ii and all a ∈ A(I) by assumption,
σt+1i (I, a) =
{
Dti (I,a)+∑
a˜∈A(I) D
t
i (I,a˜)+
if
∑
a˜D
t
i(I, a˜)+ > 0
1
|A(I)| otherwise
(7)
can be restated in terms of Dˆti(I, a).
By definition,
piσ
t
i (I) =
∏
I′∈I,P (I′)=i,a′:I′→I
σti(I
′, a′) (8)
Since all σti have no error by assumption, SD-CFR’s recomputation of pi
σt
i (I) and hence also
σ¯Ti (I, a) are exact for any I ∈ Ii and all a ∈ A(I).
To show this for trajectory-sampling SD-CFR, consider a trajectory starting at the tree’s root φ
leading to an information set in I ∈ Ii. Since σ
t
i can be deduced from Dˆ
t
i as before, B
M
i can be
seen as a buffer of iteration-strategies. Let f : I → a be a function that first chooses a σti ∈ B
M
i ,
where each σti is assigned a sampling weight of tpi
σ
i (I). f then returns an action sampled from the
distribution σti(I). Since f weights strategies like the numerator of the definition
σ¯Ti (I, a) =
∑T
t=1(tpi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I, a))∑T
t=1(tpi
σt
i (I))
(9)
executing f(I) is equivalent to sampling directly from σ¯Ti .
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Note that piσi (φ) = 1 for all σ. Thus, f(φ) would choose a given σ
t
i ∈ B
M
i with sampling weight
t. This is what trajectory-sampling SD-CFR does at φ. For each information set I ′ from φ until the
end of the trajectory, SD-CFR plays using the same iteration-strategy selected at φ. Thus, SD-CFR
will reach each information set I with a probability proportional to piσ
t
i (I) conditional on knowing
which iteration-strategy was selected. Combining these facts, we see that the assigned weight of σti
in any I is tpiσ
t
i (I) for any t up to T . It follows that the probability of σ
t
i being the acting policy in
any I is
tpiσ
t
i (I)∑T
t′=1(t
′piσ
t′
i (I))
Since this is equivalent to the weighting scheme between iteration-strategies in the definition of σ¯Ti ,
trajectory-sampling SD-CFR samples correctly from σ¯Ti .
Moreover, because the opponent does not know which σti is the acting policy, this result also shows
that an opponent cannot tell whether the agent is using this sampling method or following an explic-
itly computed σ¯Ti
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